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Scientific controversy, issue salience and E-cigarette regulation: A 
comparative study of policy debates in Germany and England  
Stefanie Ettelt and Benjamin Hawkins 
 
Abstract 
Electronic cigarettes pose a regulatory challenge to governments seeking to balance their 
potential risks and benefits in the absence of conclusive scientific evidence. This 
comparative paper aims to explain the presence and absence of controversy about e-
cigarette regulation in England and Germany, respectively. It identifies three sets of factors 
that help explain why e-cigarettes regulation became highly controversial in England, while 
in Germany this debate has been almost entirely absent. These factors relate to (1) 
differences in the perceived salience of e-cigarettes resulting from existing tobacco control 
measures, prevalence of e-cigarette use, the presence of the tobacco industry, and the role 
of public health community in public debate; (2) differences in institutional context and 
pathways of policy-making; and (3) differences in approaches to legitimise policy decisions 
through science and the judiciary. The paper highlights the complex interplay of political, 
institutional and cultural factors in explaining differences in public health decision-making. 
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Introduction 
As a new and initially unregulated technology, electronic cigarettes (e-cigarettes) pose a 
regulatory challenge to governments in the absence of conclusive scientific evidence.  In 
England, the process of developing e-cigarette regulation led to considerable controversy 
among public health researchers, advocates and policy-makers, while in Germany the same 
process did not generate the same degree of contestation.  This difference is even more 
striking since both countries introduced the same regulatory measures in addition to 
implementing the European (EU) Tobacco Product Directive (TPD) that both countries had 
agreed to transpose by May 2016.   
The paper argues that there are three sets of factors that can help explain the difference in 
the degree of policy controversy between both countries: The first set of factors relates to 
the prominence given to e-cigarettes by public health advocates and policy-makers resulting 
from existing tobacco control policies, their effects on smoking rates, the development of 
the tobacco market and incentives on consumers and tobacco firms to switch to e-
cigarettes. The second set of factors includes the institutional context of public health 
policy-making that determines the pathways of decision-making and the roles of the policy 
actors involved. A third set of factors relates to differences in policy styles shaping public 
health decisions resulting in preferences for legitimising such decisions.  To explore these 
factors, the paper draws on political science, policy analysis, public health and tobacco 
control literature.  
This paper aims to explain the difference in the degree of policy controversy in England and 
Germany associated with the regulation of e-cigarettes. It draws on a comparative case 
study using interviews with key informants and relevant documents. It contributes an 
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empirical analysis to our understanding of the factors informing the differences in policy 
controversy between countries. It also aims to contribute to the body of theory that 
conceptualises the interplay of political, institutional and cultural factors in explaining 
differences in policy discourse.  
 
Analytical framework 
The first set of factors relates to the difference in existing tobacco control measures and 
their effects on smoking rates and the market for e-cigarettes that influence the salience of 
the issue to policy actors.  The paper argues that the success of existing tobacco control 
measures, resulting in reduced smoking rates, has shaped the demand for e-cigarettes, 
which, in addition to concerns about the influence of the tobacco industry on consumer 
behaviour, has made e-cigarette policy an issue of high stakes for tobacco control and public 
health advocates (José, 2015; McKee et al., 2014; Watson and Forshaw, 2015). Salience is 
hard to define as an analytical concept, but has been associated with the importance given 
to a subject by politicians (Koop, 2011; Ringquist et al., 2003, Wlezien, 2005). In a recent 
paper, Van de Graaf and colleagues (2017) demonstrate that about the salience of 
‘fracking’, reflected in public opinion, is a key explanation for differences in decisions 
relating to shale gas regulation in Europe. Heightened attention to a topic can also increase 
scrutiny on policy processes and the demands on policy-makers to justify their decisions 
more explicitly, for example by reference to supporting evidence (Oppermann and Viehring, 
2008; Majone, 1989).  The salience of the issue of e-cigarette policy in England could then 
explain why the policy required substantial legitimation and more so than in Germany 
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where the issue was given less prominence by policy-makers and the public health 
community.   
The second set of factors relates to the institutional pathways that shaped how the 
regulatory processes unfolded and which policy actors contributed to debates about 
regulating e-cigarettes. There is a substantial comparative literature that examines how 
differences in institutional structures influence policy choices (Steinmo et al., 1992; Thelen, 
1999; Béland, 2016). Amongst liberal democracies, the UK and Germany exhibit contrasting 
constitutional models with the UK being a unitary constitutional monarchy and Germany 
being a federal republic (Colomer, 2006).  Following this institutional logic, Germany is 
portrayed as a ‘semi-sovereign state’ (Katzenstein, 1987) in which power is highly diffused 
and policy-making requires agreement from a large number of institutional veto players that 
allow only for slow incremental policy change while producing a fair amount of institutional 
inertia. In the UK, in contrast, a ‘winner-take-all’ majoritarian system tends to concentrate 
power in the executive enabling rapid and sometimes drastic policy change (Tsibelis, 2008; 
Katzenstein, 2005). This may not be so straightforward given the ongoing process of 
devolution and the changing nature of state authority in Britain since the late 1990s 
(Skelcher, 2000; Exworthy and Powell, 2004). Nonetheless, the executive still has substantial 
decision-making power. As responsibility for public health policy has been devolved to its 
constituent jurisdictions, this paper focuses on England as the comparator country, rather 
than the UK as a whole, although European policy (e.g. the TPD) applies to the UK as the 
nation state rather than to England only. 
Tuohy (1999) demonstrated that differences in institutional arrangements can produce 
idiosyncratic patterns of policy reform, with England being more likely to produce large-
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scale health reforms than countries in which power is more diffused. While it seems obvious 
that these institutional differences also result in different pathways of adapting EU 
legislation, there is debate about the extent to which the number of veto players influences 
the speed and completeness of adaptation (Haverland, 2002; Bailey, 2002). Such observed 
institutional difference highlight the role of policy actors in policy development and 
implementation, both as ‘veto players’ within the system and within the wider network of 
commentators, critics and advocates outside the decision-making process.  
A third set of factors analysed in the paper involves differences in policy styles and 
strategies of legitimation directly relating to public health (Beetham, 1991; Halffman, 2005; 
Renn, 1995; Scharpf, 1997). There is a dearth of comparative analysis of approaches to 
policy legitimation in different countries (Weiler, 1983). Knill and Lenschow (1998) attest 
Germany a high degree of ‘legalism’ (i.e. reliance on procedures defined in law) and 
especially the “binding of the administration to the law (following the principle of the 
Rechtsstaat)” which they say “traditionally serves as a substitute for democratic 
representation”. From this perspective, legitimacy of policy decisions is derived from 
compliance with the law and with legal administrative processes (Schmidt, 2005). This 
contrasts with administrative approaches to implementing policy in the UK, which 
emphasise flexibility, administrative discretion and an outcome focused regulatory style, 
which is less reliant on existing administrative practice (Knill and Lenschow, 1998). Landfried 
(1992) warned that, in Germany, the reliance on courts, especially the Constitutional Court, 
in policy-making has often led to a reduction in policy options, suggesting that this is to the 
detriment of policy outcomes. Hence judicial legitimisation comes at a cost if it limits 
opportunities and stifles flexibility in policy choices and implementation.  
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Yet centralised policy-making in the UK has been diagnosed with its own legitimacy deficits. 
The New Labour government, which came to power in the UK in 1997, attempted to rebuild 
trust in the capabilities of central government by developing strategies to ‘modernise 
government’ (HM Government, 1999). One of the recommendations of the 1999 White 
Paper ‘Modernising Government’ was for central government to draw more explicitly on 
scientific evidence and seek expert advice, in addition to being more ‘outward looking’ and 
better ‘networked’ within government (HM Government, 1999). While these ideas initially 
sprung from the progressive agenda of the ‘Third Way’, the demand on government and its 
agencies to demonstrate that policy decisions were supported by relevant scientific 
research has continued to provide a powerful narrative and strategy for legitimation, which 
in public health, with its proximity to evidence-based medicine, is perhaps particularly 
pertinent (Rutter, 2012; Haynes et al., 2015; Breckon; 2015; Sense about Science, 2016). 
However, the reliance on evidence has proven to be risky in cases of high uncertainty, such 
as e-cigarettes, in which the evidence base on their potential harms and benefits is still 
incomplete and evolving. 
 
Regulating electronic cigarettes 
E-cigarettes entered European markets in the mid-2000s and experienced a rapid increase 
in popularity. They had been on the radar of national regulators for some time before they 
came onto the agenda of the EU relatively late in the legislative process of developing the 
TPD. As the desire of the EU to adopt a comprehensive approach to e-cigarettes via the TPD 
emerged, the focus on national governments became no less important for policy actors 
seeking to shape regulation given the crucial legislative role played by the Council of the 
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European Union within the EU’s Ordinary Legislative Procedure. Policy actors sought to 
influence positions of national governments – including those of the UK and Germany – in 
Council deliberations on the TPD. Consequently, the period between 2012 and 2016, when 
the TPD was finally transposed into national legislation, is a key timeframe for seeking to 
understand the ways in which policy actors sought to position themselves and influence, or 
legitimise, policy decisions on e-cigarettes in each country. 
E-cigarettes sold within the European single market must either be licenced as medical 
devices or sold as tobacco products according to criteria set out within the TPD. Product 
approval is overseen in member-states by a designated ‘competent authority’. In England, 
this is the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), an executive 
agency of the Department of Health. In Germany, the Federal Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture oversees the implementation of the TPD, while the Federal Institute for Drugs 
and Medical Devices (BfArM) is responsible for pharmaceutical licensing. The route to 
market chosen for a given product affects various aspects of the devices, most notably the 
concentration of nicotine solutions they use and the ways in which they can be marketed 
and advertised. Devices sold as tobacco products can contain liquids with a maximum 
concentration of 20 mg/ml of nicotine and a maximum cartridge volume of 2 ml (ASH, 
2016). Liquids with nicotine concentrations above this threshold require a licence as a 
pharmaceutical; and their containers qualify as medical devices. Only products licenced as 
pharmaceutical /medical device can make claims about their health effects in marketing 
materials. The TPD also contains a number of requirements for the packaging and warning 
labels on liquids and devices are covered by regulations relating to cross border advertising 
and marketing of tobacco products related to the functioning of the single market (see 
Table 1). 
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[Table 1 about here] 
National governments remain responsible for other areas of e-cigarette policy without cross 
border effects including minimum purchase ages for e-cigarettes and rules relating to their 
use in public places. Both England and Germany passed legislation to ban the sale of e-
cigarettes to those under 18 years of age, bringing their conditions of sale into line with 
tobacco products. Both governments also decided against extending clean air legislation to 
include e-cigarettes, although private owners of premises (e.g. public houses, bars and 
restaurants) and other public and private bodies (such as train operating companies) have 
taken unilateral action to ban the use of e-cigarettes on their premises. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Yet despite the substantial communalities in the policy decisions taken, both countries 
differed substantially in the degree of controversy that e-cigarettes policy attracted. In 
England, the topic has proven to be highly controversial, dividing the public health and 
tobacco control communities. This was even more astonishing as these groups had 
previously collaborated successfully to achieve increasingly stringent tobacco control 
policies including a smoking ban in public places (Arnott et al., 2007). Yet in the case of e-
cigarettes this alliance fractured. On one side of the argument, tobacco control advocates 
highlighted the potential health risks from e-cigarette consumption and the danger of e-
cigarettes undoing previous tobacco control efforts (principally by renormalising smoking, 
undermining clean air legislation and circumventing current restrictions on advertising and 
branding). Proponents also worried about the tobacco industry strategically using e-
cigarettes to re-claim the market for cigarettes and to re-establish their diminished 
influence in the policy-making process (José, 2015; McKee et al., 2014; Watson and 
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Forshaw, 2015). In their view, it was obvious that the ultimate aim for the tobacco industry 
was to maintain smoking rates through the recruitment of new smokers (the so-called 
‘gateway hypothesis’) and deterring current smokers from quitting (McKee, 2013). 
In contrast, proponents of a harm reduction approach argued that e-cigarettes might 
provide an alternative to smoking for those addicted to nicotine without exposing them to 
many of the health risks associated with burning tobacco. For them, e-cigarettes potentially 
provided an approach to reducing harm to smokers and hence a solution to a public health 
problem that could be more cost effective than publicly funded cessation programmes 
(Brown 2015; Gostin, 2015; McNeill et al., 2014; O’Connor and Fenton, 2015).  
In Germany, in contrast, the harm reduction argument was largely absent in public 
discourse and scientific debate. E-cigarette regulation is strongly opposed by vaping activists 
as articulated in various internet fora and the Verband des e-Zigarettenhandels (VdeH), the 
trade association of e-cigarette producers and sellers, lobbies for regulatory restraint. 
However, in wider public discourse the argument for promoting e-cigarettes was much less 
visible and was made less forcefully by proponents.  
 
Methods 
This paper aims to explain the difference in the degree of policy controversy in England and 
Germany. It uses semi-structured interviews with key policy actors in the UK and Germany 
engaged with the issue of e-cigarette regulation. Data collected from interviews where 
supplemented by information gained from policy documents, court decisions, and media 
articles from a range of outlets including the BBC, The Telegraph and The Guardian (for 
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England) and Spiegel online, Der Spiegel, Die Zeit, die Welt, Tageszeitung (for Germany). 
Media articles were searched through the media outlets’ own databases using search terms 
such as ‘electronic cigarettes’, ‘e-cigarettes’ or ‘vaping’ (for English media) and 
‘elektronische Zigarette’ and ‘e-Zigarette’ (for German media). Other documents were 
identified through media reports (e.g. of legal cases) and interviews and purposive searchers 
(e.g. on government websites).  
Interviewees were identified through a review of relevant policy documents and 
publications on the issue, through attendance at e-cigarette conferences and events and 
through ‘snowballing’ i.e. by asking respondents identified through initial scoping activities 
to suggest further interviewees. In total, 16 interviews were carried out - nine in the UK and 
seven in Germany. Interviewees in the UK included one government official, three 
researchers and five representatives of professional or civil society organisations engaged in 
tobacco control debates; for Germany, we interviewed three officials (of whom two worked 
for federal and one for state organisations) and four researchers.  Interviews were 
conducted in person or over the phone and lasted around an hour in length each. Most 
interviews were conducted jointly by the authors in the native langue of respondents.  
All interviews were transcribed and analysed in the original language. Quotes from the 
German interviews presented here were translated by the authors. Respondents were 
offered anonymity and confidentiality for their responses. Quotes are only attributed in 
ways which protect respondents from identification, referring only to the country and the 
sector in which they work where this is relevant to the status of the information they supply 
and its evaluation by the reader. Quotes given are designed as illustrative examples of the 
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points made with indications given of how widely shared the viewpoints were amongst 
respondents.  
The analysis of the transcripts of the UK interviews were led by BH and of interviews in 
Germany by SE. Themes were generated iteratively through document analysis, 
engagement with relevant literatures and the analysis of the interviews. The authors liaised 
on the identification of codes and the coding process throughout the analysis phase. SE led 
the comparative analysis and wrote the first draft of the paper, which was then edited, 
revised and refined by BH.  Authors discussed themes and the emerging comparative 
framework throughout the analysis and writing process.  
 
Existing tobacco control policies and their effects on markets and consumption 
The first set of factors relates to the differences in existing tobacco control policies and their 
effects on the tobacco and e-cigarette markets that informed the scale, and intensity, of the 
debate surrounding the regulation of e-cigarettes in both countries, with e-cigarettes being 
substantially more controversial in England than in Germany. This analysis identified four 
interrelated themes that explain the difference in the perceived relevance of e-cigarettes as 
a public health concern: (1) existing tobacco control legislation (and thus the ability to sell 
and market conventional cigarettes) that provides the backdrop for the regulation of e-
cigarettes; (2) the prevalence of e-cigarette consumption and the growth of the market for 
e-cigarettes; (3) the involvement of ‘big tobacco’ firms in this market; and (4) the propensity 
of the public health community to advocate for, and scrutinise, public health policy 
decisions, and to involve themselves in policy debate.  
13 
 
(1)  While both countries have put in place increasingly stringent tobacco control measures 
over time, England has implemented more comprehensive tobacco control legislation than 
Germany and, as a result, smoking prevalence has fallen more rapidly. England has 
implemented a comprehensive set of tobacco control measures including legislation to 
prohibit smoking in public places, bans on advertising and promotion of cigarettes, and 
stringent rules on packaging and labelling. Germany has made significant steps to 
discourage smoking in recent years, yet these efforts are less comprehensive and regionally 
fragmented (e.g. bans on smoking in bars and restaurants fall under the remit of the 16 
Länder). Germany is now the only country in the EU that still allows billboard advertising of 
cigarettes and has only recently introduced images as warning labels on cigarette packages.  
As a result, the smoking rate in the UK has now fallen to under 20 percent of people aged 15 
years and over, while in Germany, smoking rates among adults are still at almost 28 percent 
(WHO 2016).  It follows that smokers in Germany experience less pressure to quit smoking 
or to switch to alternative sources of nicotine than in the UK. It also seems plausible that the 
tobacco industry has less clear incentives in Germany than in other countries to enter the e-
cigarette market as this would risk undercutting its current, still highly profitable, business 
model.  
(2)  Current numbers of e-cigarette users rely on estimates, but data from a 2016 survey in 
Germany suggest that less than one percent of people over the age of 16 years were using 
e-cigarettes at the time (DKFZ, 2016).  In England, it is estimated that over six percent of 
adults used e-cigarettes, with numbers having risen rapidly from 700,000 in 2012 to 2.8 
million in 2016 (ASH 2016).  This led to a sense of urgency among public health advocates in 
tackling e-cigarette regulation in the face of their rapidly increasing popularity (see e.g. The 
Guardian,2014, and The Telegraph,2015). In Germany, regulatory authorities became aware 
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of e-cigarettes early in the mid-2000s, but user numbers have remained relatively low and 
interviewees (a state policy-maker and a researcher) were divided in their judgement as to 
whether e-cigarettes were a noticeable presence and a reason for concern:    
“I only noticed this [people using e-cigarettes] in the beginning as a little hype, 
somewhere in my personal environment, but since then the topic has completely 
disappeared. I do not see them at all.” (GE 15) 
“Yes, a few years ago I did not see much of them in the streets and this was more 
something … well, a procedure that we heard about from the US or in reports, but this 
has changed. If you now walk through the city, there are more people who use e-
cigarettes, at bus stops for example.” (GE 19) 
(3)  Concerns in England were also triggered by the fact that large tobacco companies had 
begun to invest heavily in the e-cigarette market (McKee, 2012; Gornall, 2015). In Germany, 
in contrast, e-cigarettes were still seen as niche products, as most products on sale were 
imports from China in addition to a few products manufactured by small home-grown 
companies (e.g. Red Kiwi):  
“E-cigarette have essentially been marketed for four years now by individual tobacco 
firms, they are promoted not yet by large but by small [firms].  To put it simply, they are 
not produced by large companies but by small niche producers, almost always in China, 
and are sold here on the grey market.”  (GE 16) 
The absence of big tobacco firms cannot be taken as a certainty, as the market for e-
cigarettes in Germany is highly opaque (e.g. the ownership of brands is often not visible; the 
trade organisation for e-cigarette producers and sellers does not identify its members). If 
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the celebratory tone of press releases of the association of e-cigarette producers and sellers 
in Germany is any indication, the market is growing rapidly (VDEH, 2016).  However, 
interviewees were not aware of any presence of the tobacco industry in the market. For 
some, this resonated with previous experience of tobacco companies having substantial 
influence on policy-making in Germany, which they used to stymie attempts of more 
stringent tobacco control:   
“I think, in Germany, there are rarely concerns that the industry could have too much 
influence, I say this very clearly. I think politicians [literally: politics] simply do not care. 
[The perception is that] They [i.e. the firms] should be economically successful, they 
should make money, they should bring in plenty of tobacco taxes, although we know 
that this is not really that much given that we would also reduce the [burden of] 
disease. And everything else is not of interest to them […]. There is no concern that the 
industry could be too influential.” (GE 19) 
In England, in contrast, engagement with the tobacco industry has been anathema for 
policy-makers for more than a decade and the risk of large tobacco companies gaining 
influence over the e-cigarette market has been an expressed concern among public health 
researchers and advocates (Gornall, 2015).  In relation to e-cigarettes, proximity to the 
tobacco industry has become a major bone of contention within the public health 
community (e.g. Lancet, 2015; Glantz, 2015).  
(4)  England has a sizeable, confident, and historically well-grounded public health 
community that has made tobacco control one of its cornerstones and key achievements. 
This community works across disciplinary and professional boundaries and includes 
academic researchers, advocacy organisations, charitable and governmental research 
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funders, as well as the medical community. These actors had successfully cooperated in the 
past to build the evidence base in support of tobacco control (Arnott, 2007).  By 
comparison, the relevant public health community in Germany is fragmented and small, 
both by academic standards and in relation to Germany’s population size. It is often said 
that in Germany public health was discredited through its association with the ideology of 
Rassenhygiene during the Third Reich. Although the argument is likely to be overstretched 
to explain the lack of presence in public health debate, the reputational damage has 
persisted, and in the seventy years since, ‘Public Health Germany’, as one interviewee 
noted, has not been able to overcome its fragmentation. This is also visible in the lack of 
funding available for public health research, both from government and charitable sources, 
which has significantly lagged behind other types of health research funding (Gerhardus, 
2014) and the difficulty of bringing together the various disciplines contributing to public 
health research (Razum and Dockweiler, 2015).  
This is notable in relation to tobacco control, with the German Centre for Cancer Research 
(DKFZ), a Collaborating Centre of WHO, taking a prominent, and largely singular, role in 
conducting research on the risks and prevalence of smoking, the influence and tactics of the 
tobacco industry, and the effects of tobacco control interventions. It is also well 
documented that over several decades German science was heavily influenced by the 
tobacco industry, with medical researchers accepting substantial amounts of funding from 
the industry, exposing themselves to pressures to produce research that systematically 
underplayed the harms of smoking (Grüning et al. 2006, Kyriss et al., 2008). The DKFZ is now 
an established and influential policy actor that is well networked with both the media and 
policy-makers in government. Yet it is perceived as a lone voice, dominating a highly 
17 
 
fragmented public health community that does not have the critical mass, cohesion, or 
funding that would compare well with public health advocacy in England.  
„We find it difficult to deal with public health in Germany because of our history, so the 
Third Reich, and its perversion of the idea of public health. It is surely so that public 
health has gradually become more important again in Germany and research has 
certainly contributed to this, but it is still a very slow process.” (GE 19) 
As a result, there was only one (dominant) policy actor in Germany and this actor advocated 
stringent regulation of e-cigarettes, while in England there were a number of competing 
voices within the public health sector, representing a range of perspective on the potential 
risks and benefits of e-cigarettes.  
 
Institutional contexts and pathways 
The second set of factors concerns differences relating to the process of making e-cigarettes 
regulation and the policy actors involved in this process, suggesting institutional differences 
in policy-making and differences in policy styles between the two countries.  
In Germany, the Federal Institute for Risk Assessment (BfR) published a first assessment 
report on e-cigarettes in 2008, taking a cautionary approach and warning consumers about 
their potential, but yet unclear, health risks. Other federal agencies such as the Federal 
Institute for Drugs and Medical Devices (BfArM) and the Federal Office of Consumer 
Protection and Food Safety (BVL) followed suit, issuing statements on the regulatory options 
for e-cigarettes. Yet at this stage it was not clear how e-cigarettes could be regulated (e.g. as 
a pharmaceutical, tobacco product or consumer product) and which public authority would 
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be responsible for doing so. BVL declared that e-cigarettes could not be considered a 
tobacco product, while the BfArM concluded that e-cigarettes could be regulated as 
pharmaceuticals because of their pharmacological effects (BfArM, 2013).  
Concerns about e-cigarettes were also shared by the Länder, some of whom requested 
clarification from federal authorities about how to deal with e-cigarettes. In December 
2011, the health minister of North Rhine Westphalia (NRW), Barbara Steffens, warned that 
e-cigarettes were associated with unclear health risks and that selling e-cigarettes was 
illegal unless they had a pharmaceutical licence (MGEPA, 2011). Yet this position became 
untenable when a vendor took the NRW minister to court and the court ruled that e-
cigarettes could not be classified as pharmaceuticals. More specifically, the court judged 
that “there is no scientific evidence that [e-cigarettes] are effective in treating nicotine 
addiction”, hence did not qualify as a pharmaceutical (Administrative Court, Cologne, 7 K 
3169/11). The court also ruled that e-cigarettes could not be considered tobacco products, 
which meant that existing regulation on cigarettes did not apply to them either. By rejecting 
these classifications, the court (and the state level court that confirmed the decision) 
reduced the options for public authorities to regulate e-cigarettes as it was not possible to 
apply an existing body of law to the new product. It became apparent that e-cigarettes 
required a new legislative initiative at national level, yet this stalled when it became clear 
that e-cigarettes would be part of the emerging EU directive.  
In England, the Medical and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) emerged as the 
main authority seeking to assume responsibility for regulating e-cigarettes. The agency 
initially declared its intention to regulate e-cigarettes as pharmaceuticals, but from 2013, 
Public Health England (PHE), a newly created executive agency, was mandated with 
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gathering the evidence on e-cigarettes as a priority issue (DH 2014; DH 2015). Subsequently, 
PHE commissioned a series of reports on the topic in 2014 and 2015, aimed at bringing 
together the existing evidence on e-cigarettes (McNeill et al., 2015, Britton and 
Bogdanovica, 2014, Bauld et al., 2014). One report, published in August 2015, claimed that 
e-cigarettes were ‘95% safer’ than conventional cigarettes (McNeill et al., 2015). These 
assertions led to a major controversy between PHE and researchers who advocated a harm 
reduction approach to regulation on the one hand, and researchers who questioned the 
validity of the evidence in support of the harm-reduction claims, and advocated for a 
precautionary approach on the other hand.  
Such controversy about the meaning and interpretation of scientific evidence did not take 
place in German research and policy communities.  While a few interviewees supported the 
position that e-cigarettes could potentially reduce the health risk of smokers if they were to 
switch to e-cigarettes, this position was not widely held and not promoted by federal or 
state government actors.  Representatives of government administrations or agencies 
advocated a cautionary approach, while pointing out the remaining unknowns relating to 
the effects of e-cigarettes use as a quitting aid.  
“Then there was the health research or public health-oriented debate on e-cigarettes. Is 
this a healthy product compared to smoking? It surely is healthier. But we did not want 
to step into this trap and say that e-cigarettes are harmless. Therefore, we do not advise 
to smoke [sic] e-cigarettes.” (GE 16).  
In line with their different administrative traditions, England and Germany also applied 
different approaches to transposing the TPD into national legislation. In England, this was 
done by executive order only, issued by the Department of Health on behalf of the 
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Government. In Germany, the transposition required new primary legislation, passed by 
federal parliament. The Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture, responsible for the 
implementation of the TPD, developed a draft bill (Referentenentwurf) in June 2015 that 
was consequently discussed and amended by several federal ministries involved (e.g. 
Ministries of Health and Finance), the governing political parties, the Cabinet, and the 
Chancellery. The most obvious change made in the final version of the Act on Tobacco 
Products (Tabakerzeugnisgesetz) was the deletion of the ban on billboard and cinema 
advertising for both conventional and electronic cigarettes, which had been proposed in the 
draft bill by the Federal Ministry of Health. As a result, Germany continues to be in breach of 
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control despite being one of its signatories.  
Governments in both countries, however, used the opportunity of the TPD to tighten the 
minimum purchase ages for e-cigarettes. As a result, both countries put the same measures 
in place to regulate e-cigarettes, although the processes leading to these decisions, the 
policy actors involved and the intensity of controversy surrounding e-cigarettes were 
substantially different.   
 
Routes to legitimising policy positions 
Finally, the debate surrounding e-cigarette policy also highlights different strategies of 
legitimising policy positions, which are analysed here as a third set of factors. For the 
purpose of this analysis, such positions are presented either as contributions to debate by 
advocates/critics or as policy decisions made by governments/parliaments.  
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In Germany, prior to the TPD, the search for approaches to legitimating e-cigarette 
regulation resulted in a period of uncertainty about which public authority was responsible 
for the new technology. While e-cigarettes came onto the radar of a number of government 
agencies early in the 2000s, it was not clear who would be responsible and which body of 
law would apply to e-cigarettes. BfArM and some state health ministries tried to force a 
solution, but their position was challenged successfully in court.  
Conflict resolution between these different positions was sought through court cases, in 
which courts rejected several options of classifying e-cigarettes, yet without giving guidance 
on how e-cigarettes should be regulated if existing law did not apply. While this practice is 
reflective of the ‘legalistic’ political culture in Germany, it is problematic insofar as it closed 
options that had been seen as desirable by some. Courts made reference to scientific 
evidence on e-cigarettes, noting the absence of proof of a curative benefit, yet the 
legitimacy of the decision arose from the status of courts within the state rather than their 
particular way of reasoning.  
In England, in contrast, the entire debate about regulating e-cigarettes revolved around the 
interpretation of evidence. Most obviously, evidence emerged as a source of legitimacy for 
the policy positions adopted on the issue. All respondents, regardless of the types of 
organisation they represented or the position they adopted, adhered to the principle of 
evidence-based policy-making and claimed to be led by evidence in developing their 
positions on the issue. At the same time, many respondents criticised other policy actors for 
failing to follow the evidence base. As one researcher in the field commented: 
“So, when we have public health scientists who are supposed to be trusted individuals, 
or public health bodies that are, for whatever reason, you know, and I completely 
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understand the motives, but are not interpreting the science correctly, and are using 
double standards … you know, if we take, for example, the discussion over plain 
packaging, which I fully support, or the evidence relating to e-cigarettes or the evidence 
relating to a drug like Varenicline, […] it’s very interesting seeing people applying really 
different standards of evidence for what they are willing to believe.” (EN 6).  
PHE in particular put itself in the firing line when publishing several reports that summarised 
the evidence on the risks and benefits of e-cigarettes. Its conclusion, based on these 
reviews, that e-cigarettes should not be regulated too strictly in order not to discourage 
heavy smokers to use e-cigarettes instead of tobacco was fiercely contested by public health 
researchers who felt that significant parts of the evidence relevant to decisions on e-
cigarettes had purposefully been cast aside, especially with regard to the role of tobacco 
companies in creating a new market for themselves.   
Another strategy of PHE to legitimate its position and influence the discourse that 
increasingly had spiralled out of control was to build a consensus among researchers, 
advocates and policy-makers. This strategy was seen as one of the key factors of previous 
successes in tobacco control (Arnott et al., 2007). As one official explained:  
“That’s why we were in a position in October when all the key organisations were able 
to come together and say actually we think PHE are right, because we’d been talking for 
years. And yes, there were other people who weren’t involved in that discussion for 
years, who had either not been invited or just weren’t interested or had chosen not to 
be part of it, they were outside that consensus and they made a lot of noise at the 
consensus. But it didn’t really influence the consensus. So yes, the evidence-based 
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consensus building project, back on harm reduction, yes, it’s all done in PHE but it is the 
way PHE works.” (EN 5). 
However, not everyone agreed and so the ‘consensus’ became an agreement among some 
rather than a position shared by all relevant policy actors.  
Efforts at building consensus were also made in Germany, yet this was undertaken by 
advocates rather than government organisations. This approach resulted in the publication 
of a ‘Memorandum’ that reiterated the demand for a precautionary approach stating that e-
cigarettes posed significant risks to public health and were not proven to be effective as a 
quitting aid (DKFZ, 2015). This document was developed by two tobacco control advocates, 
the DKFZ and the Aktionsbündnis Nichtrauchen, and signed by 48 medical societies, charities 
and tobacco control advocacy organisations.  The key purpose of this memorandum was to 
demonstrate to the German government that all relevant actors in the medical community 
were in support of comprehensive regulation.  
In England, the attempt to create a consensus based on evidence resulted in the publication 
of a report that contained the widely publicised claim that e-cigarettes were ‘95% safer’ 
than conventional cigarettes (McNeill and Hayek 2015). The vehement criticism of the 
report, and the 95 figure in particular, by researchers and other actors in the field, appeared 
to undermine any claims to there being an emerging consensus on the identification and 
interpretation of existing evidence on e-cigarettes or the appropriate policy responses to 
them (Lancet 2015; Capewell and McKee 2015). The idea of an emerging consensus is 
closely allied to the identification of a core group of scholars considered to be experts on 
the issue, whilst the credentials of those outside of this is called into question. As one 
researcher commented: 
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“You know… people who actually work in the field primarily are of one view. And then 
where the controversy is, is by and large, very high profile public health people who 
don’t actually work in the field. […] And it’s actually a relatively small number of people 
here who are not really tobacco experts. [One colleague] is someone who is in the field 
and who takes a similar view but […] we’re good friends and we don’t really have a 
disagreement because [they say], I hear what you’re saying around the evidence, I’ve 
got no problem with that. However, these are my worries. Absolutely fine. And so we 
can have a friendly, you know, discussion about it. […] But I think that, my hypothesis is 
that there is a lot of tobacco control experts in this country. And they are almost all of 
pretty much the same view.” (EN 6) 
The difficulty, and ultimately failure, of creating agreement around ‘the evidence’ highlights 
a particular understanding of the role and purpose of scientific research in relation to policy-
making, with some protagonists arguably holding naive rationalist views of a linear 
relationship between research and policy. This interpretation of events, however, 
misunderstands the dispute as a disagreement about scientific facts while it is more likely to 
be a disagreement on values, priorities and policy objectives, propelled by a deep mistrust 
of tobacco companies and a fear of undoing the hard-won achievements of previous 
tobacco control efforts.  
This controversy between tobacco control and harm reduction advocates within the public 
health community, and its recourse to evidence claims, was much more limited in Germany.  
This is perhaps unsurprising given fragmentation of the public health community, with the 
DKFZ being the only, and by now dominant, advocate in the field that has put forward any 
arguments relating to the potential harms of e-cigarettes. These claims have drawn heavily 
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on evidence, such as studies on the toxicity of liquids, the effects of dual usage and e-
cigarette usage (DKFZ, 2014; DKFZ, 2014; DKFZ, 2016), and have found a substantial media 
and policy audience, while other, contrasting positions, although mentioned in private in 
interviews, had little resonance with the media and Federal Government.   
 
Discussion and conclusion 
This paper compared the factors that explain why e-cigarettes regulation has become much 
more controversial in England than in Germany. More specifically, the paper has identified 
differences in existing tobacco control and market development that shape the prominence 
of the issue, in the institutional contexts and pathways of decision-making, and in forms of 
legitimating policy positions.  
Explaining the presence or absence of controversy on specific policy issues in different 
national contexts is a difficult undertaking, given the complex array of factors influencing 
policy debates. In the case of e-cigarettes, it is plausible that differences in previous efforts 
to control tobacco consumption have had an effect on the motivation of tobacco firms to 
enter the market for e-cigarettes and that such market activity provoked suspicion from 
public health advocates. It is also likely that public health advocates have learned lessons 
from previous encounters with the tobacco industry that inform these concerns (José, 2015; 
McKee et al., 2014; Watson and Forshaw, 2015). From a comparative perspective, it is then 
possible to argue that e-cigarettes regulation has been more salient to the public health 
community in England than in Germany, where the public health community is less 
influential, and perhaps less interested, in stimulating public debate. However, it is 
impossible to test this chain of reasoning and so it remains only a working hypothesis. The 
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absence of controversy is more difficult to explain than its presence and more research is 
needed to examine the public discourses on e-cigarettes in the media (including social 
media such as Facebook and Twitter) to develop a better understanding of the content of 
debates and the networks in which these take place. 
The analysis of institutional pathways, in contrast, clearly resonates with the existing 
literature on national differences between policy actors, processes and policy styles. 
Establishing who is responsible for regulating a novel technology is more complex in 
Germany given the larger number of potential regulators and the reliance on law and courts 
is more prominent than in England where policy development in this instance, including the 
transposition of EU law, was a matter of governmental decision-making only. This left 
England with more flexibility in exploring policy options (with the exception of those already 
dealt with at EU level) than Germany where court rulings closed down several regulatory 
options prior to the TPD (Landfried, 1992). The question is, however, whether this openness 
to generating options in the absence of opposition from veto players also leaves more space 
for controversy, which may depend on whether a policy solution proposed by the executive 
(here PHE) is seen as legitimate.  Again there are limits as to whether this can be established 
through this analysis, as other causes are possible, for example, court rulings that stimulate 
rather than ended debate (e.g. in relation to the recent revision of inheritance law in 
Germany; FAZ, 2016).  
In both countries, efforts were made by some policy actors to engineer a consensus in 
support of a preferred policy option with reference to scientific evidence: in England, this 
was a strategy employed by PHE in support of the harm reduction approach, in Germany the 
DKFZ marshalled 50 medical societies and tobacco control organisations to demand more 
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stringent tobacco control and e-cigarette regulation. However, the contestation of the 
evidence in support of policy options undermined the consensus in England by bringing to 
the fore uncertainties about the risks and benefits associated with e-cigarettes in the 
absence of conclusive evidence. While both sides of the argument used evidentiary claims 
to support their positions, diverging views on policy objectives, and values and beliefs 
underpinning these objectives, while couched in terms of evidence, were at the core of the 
disagreement (e.g. views on the potential risks and benefits of regulation; attitudes towards 
the tobacco industry). In Germany, disagreements about values were also articulated in 
court cases, yet the harm reduction argument held little currency both with courts and with 
policy-makers in government or parliament. While courts rejected regulatory options, 
noting the absence of supporting evidence, they did not provide a solution to the regulatory 
problem. Referring to existing law proved insufficient to resolve a conflict over the 
regulation of a novel technology. Hence there is a parallel between the shortcomings of 
legitimising decisions through scientific evidence and through recourse to the law as both 
are retrospective in orientation and ill-equipped to deal with new challenges, emerging risk 
and uncertainty, which may require a more flexible, adaptive approach to governance (Renn 
and Klinke, 2013).  
In comparing the presence and absence of debate about e-cigarette regulation in England 
and Germany, this paper underlines the importance of considering the complex interplay of 
factors as diverse as recent developments in regulation and markets, historical trajectories 
of academic and advocacy communities, institutional context that shape decision-making 
pathways, and established routes for legitimisation. The paper therefore highlights the 
complex interplay of political, institutional and cultural factors in explaining differences in 
regulatory decision-making.   
28 
 
  
29 
 
References 
Arnott, D., Dockrell, M., Sandford, A., Willmore, I. 2007. ‘Comprehensive smoke-free 
legislation in England: how advocacy won the day’, Tobacco Control 16: 423-428. 
ASH. 2016. Use of electronic cigarettes (vapourisers) among adults in Great Britain. Action 
on Smoking and Health Fact sheet. http://www.ash.org.uk/files/documents/ASH_891.pdf, 
accessed 19 December 2016. 
ASH. 2016. The impact of the EU Tobacco Products Directive on e-cigarette regulation in the 
UK. Briefing. London, Action on Smoking and Health.  
Bauld, L., Angus, K., De, A.M. 2014. E-cigarette uptake and marketing: A report 
commissioned by Public Health England. London, Public Health England. 
Béland, D. 2016. ‘Kingdon Reconsidered: Ideas, Interests and Institutions in Comparative 
Policy Analysis’, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, 18(3): 228-242. 
Beetham, D. 1991. The legitimation of power. Basingstoke, Macmillan. 
BfArM. 2013. Jahresbericht 2012/13. Bonn, Bundesinstitut für Arzneimittel und 
Medizinprodukte.  
Breckon, J. 2015. Better public services through experimental government. London, Alliance 
for Useful Evidence.  
Britton, J., Bogdanovica, I. 2014. Electronic cigarettes. A report commissioned by Public 
Health England. London, Public Health England.  
Brown, J. 2015. ‘A positive view on e-cigarettes’. Letter. BMJ 351: h3864. 
Colomer, J.P. 2006. ‘Comparative constitutions’. Rhodes, R.A.W., Binder, S.A., Rockman, B.A. 
(eds.): The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions. Oxford, Oxford University Press: 217-
238. 
DH. 2014. PHE’s role. Letter to the Chief Executive and the Chairman of Public Health 
England, dated 11 June 2014. London, Department of Health. 
30 
 
DH. 2015. Public Health England strategic remit and priorities. Letter to the Chief Executive 
and the Chairman of Public Health England, dated 25 March 2015. London, Department of 
Health.  
DKFZ. 2014. Gesundheitsgefährdung von Kindern und Jugendlichen durch E-Zigaretten: 
Verkaufsverbot an unter 18-Jährige unabhänging vom Nikotingehalt erforderlich. 
Heidelberg, Deutsches Krebsforschungszentrum.  
DKFZ. 2014. Stellungnahme zur kontroversen Diskussion um E-Zigaretten. Heidelberg, 
Deutsches Krebsforschungszentrum.  
DKFZ. 2015. Memorandum des Deutschen Krebsforschungszentrums (DKFZ) and des 
Aktionsbündnis Nichtrauchen e.V. (ABNR) zur gesetzlichen Regulierung von nikotinhaltigen 
und nikotinfreien E-Zigaretten. Unterstützt von einer Vielzahl medizinischer und 
wissenschaftlicher Fachgesellschaften und Institutionen. Heidelberg, Deutsches 
Krebsforschungszentrum.  
DKFZ. 2016. E-Zigaretten: Konsumverhalten in Deutschland 2014-2016. Aus der Wissenschaft 
– für die Politik. Heidelberg, Deutsches Krebsforschungszentrum.  
Exworthy, M. & Powell, M. 2004. ‘Big windows and little windows: implementation in the 
‘congested state’‘. Public Administration, 82, 263-281. 
FAZ. 2016. ‘Die privilegierten Erben‘. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, published 22 
September 2016.  
Gerhardus, A. 2014. ‘Public Health Research in Germany 2014. Overview and lessons (yet to 
be) learned‘. DFG Roundtable discussion on ‘Public Health Research in Germany: Criteria 
and structures‘. January 20-21, 2014, Bonn, Germany. 
Glantz, S. 2015. ‘UK report claiming e-cigs 95% safer than cigs based on one industry-linked 
report questions PHE‘s scientific credibility’. Letter. BMJ 351: h4863. 
Gornall, J. 2015. ‘Why e-cigarettes are dividing the public health community’. BMJ 350: 
h3317. 
Gornall, J. 2015.’ British American Tobacco puts tobacco in new e-cigarette’. BMJ 351: 
h6314. 
31 
 
Gostin, L.O. 2015. ‘Regulating e-cigarettes to help them realise their potential as an anti-
smoking tool’. Letter. BMJ 350: h3767. 
Grüning, T., Gilmore, A. B. & McKee, M. 2006. ‘Tobacco Industry Influence on Science and 
Scientists in Germany’. American Journal of Public Health, 96, 20-32. 
Halffman, W. 2005. ‘Science/Policy boundaries: National styles?’. Science and Public Policy 
32, 457-468. 
Haverland, M. 2000. ‘National adaptation to European integration: The importance of 
institutional veto points’. Journal of Public Policy 20 (1): 83-103. 
Haynes, L., Goldacre, B. & Torgerson, D. 2012. Test, Learn, Adapt: Developing Public Policy 
with Randomised Controlled Trials. London: Cabinet Office. 
José, R.J. 2015. ‘Potential risk of carcinogen in e-cigarette vapour’. Letter. BMJ 351: h5004. 
Katzenstein, P. 1987. Policy and politics in West Germany: The growth of a semisovereign 
state. Philadelphia, Temple University Press.  
Katzenstein, P. J. 2005. ‘Conclusion: Semisovereignty in United Germany’. Green, S., 
Paterson, W.E. (eds.): Governance in contemporary Germany: the semisovereign state 
revisited. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 283-306. 
Koop, C. 2011. ‘Explaining the accountability of independent agencies: the importance of 
political salience’. Journal of Public Policy, 31, 209-234. 
Kyriss, T., Pötschke-Langer, M. & Grüning, T. 2008. ‘Der Verband der Cigarettenindustrie - 
Verhinderung wirksamer Tabakkontrollpolitik in Deutschland’. Gesundheitswesen, 70, 315-
324. 
Lancet 2015.’ E-cigarettes: Public Health England‘s evidence-based confusion. Editorial’. The 
Lancet 386: 829. 
Landfried, C. 1992. ‘Judicial policy-making in Germany: The federal constitutional court’. 
Western European Politics 15 (3): 50-67. 
Majone, G. 1989. Evidence, argument and persuasion in the policy process. New Haven, Yale 
University Press.  
32 
 
McKee, M. 2013. ‘E-cigarettes and the marketing push that surprised everyone. Ongoing 
debate in Europe over regulation may favour the interests of the industry’. BMJ 347, doi: 
10.1136/bmj.f5780.  
McKee, M., Chapman, S., Daube, M., Glantz, S. 2014. ‘The debate on electronic cigarettes’. 
Correspondence. The Lancet 384: 2107.  
McNeill, A., Etter, J-F, Farsalinos, K., Hajek, P., Le Houezec, J., McRobbie, H. 2014. ’A critique 
of a World Health Organization-commissioned report and associated paper on electronic 
cigarettes’. Addition 109 (21): 2128-2134.  
McNeill, A., Brose, L., Calder, R., Hitchman, S., Hajek, P., McRobbie, H. 2015. E-cigarettes: an 
evidence update. London, Public Health England.  
MGEPA. 2011. Ministerin Steffens warnt vor Verkauf von illegalen E-Zigaretten: 
Geschäftsgründungen sind riskant – Gesundheitsschäden zu befürchten. Press release, 
issued 16 December 2011. Düsseldorf, Ministry of Health, Equality, Care and Ageing.  
Montpetit, E. 2008. ‘Policy design for legitimacy: Expert knowledge, citizens, time and 
inclusion in the United Kingdom’s biotechnology sector’. Public Administration 86 (1): 259-
277. 
O’Connor, R., Fenton, K. 2015. ‘E-cigarettes: spelling out the available evidence for the 
public’. Correspondence. The Lancet 386: 1237. 
Razum, O., Dockweiler, C. 2015. ‘GeneralistInnen oder SpezialistInnen? Interdisziplinarität 
und fachliche Differenzierung innerhalb von Public Health’. Gesundheitswesen DOI 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1055/s-0034-1395629. 
Renn, O. 2005. ‘Style of using scientific expertise: a comparative framework’. Science and 
Public Policy 22 (3): 147-156. 
Renn, O., Klinke, A. 2013. ‘A framework of adaptive risk governance for urban planning’. 
Sustainability 5: 2036-2059. 
Ringquist, E. J., Worsham, J. & Eisner, M. A. 2003. ‘Salience, complexity, and the legislative 
direction of regulatory bureaucracies’. Journal of Public Administration Research and 
Theory, 13, 141-164. 
33 
 
Rutter, J. 2012. Evidence and evaluation in policy making. A problem of supply and demand? 
London, Institute for Government.  
Scharpf, F.W. 1995. Games real actors play: Actor-centred institutionalism in policy research. 
Boulder (CO.): Westview Press.  
Sense about Science. 2016. Transparency of evidence: An assessment of government policy 
proposal May 2015 to May 2016. London, Sense about Science.  
Skelcher, C. 2000. ‘Changing images of the state: overloaded, hollowed-out, congested’. 
Public Policy and Administration 15, 3-19. 
Steinmo, S., Thelen, K., Longstreth, F. 1992. Structuring politics. Historical institutionalism in 
comparative analysis. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.  
Thelen, K. 1999. ‘Historical institutionalism in comparative politics’. Annual Review of 
Political Science 2: 369-404.  
The Guardian. 2014. Boom in e-cigarette sales divides smoking campaigners. Published 21 
February 2014.  
The Telegraph. 2015. Four in 10 teenage e-cigarette users would not have smoked, warn 
health experts. Published 31 May 2015. 
Van de Graaf, T., Haesebrouck, T., Debaere, P. 2017. ‘Fractured politics? The comparative 
regulation of shale gas in Europe’. Journal of European Public Policy. Published online 20 
April 2017. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2017.1301985 
VdEH. 2016. eZigarettenverband erwartet ausgezeichnetes Jahresendgeschäft. Press release 
published 8 December 2016. http://www.vd-eh.de/ezigarettenverband-erwartet-
ausgezeichnetes-jahresendgeschaeft/, accessed 16 December 2016. 
Watson, M., C.; Forshaw, M. 2015. ‘Why we shouldn’t normalise the use of e-cigarettes’. 
Letter. BMJ 351: h3770. 
Weiler, H. N. 1983. ‘Legalization, expertise, and participation: Strategies of compensatory 
legitimation in educational policy’. Comparative Education Review, 27, 259-277. 
34 
 
WHO. 2016. FCTC Implementation database. Germany, 2016 report. 
http://apps.who.int/fctc/implementation/database/parties/Germany, accessed 20 January 
2017. 
Wlezien, C. 2005. ‘On the salience of political issues: The problem with ‘most important 
problem’’. Electoral Studies 24: 555-579. 
  
35 
 
Table 1 
Regulation included in the Tobacco Products Directive relating to e-cigarettes 
Notification of ‘competent authorities’ 6 months before launch of new product 
Nicotine content no higher than 20mg per ml 
Health warnings and consumer information 
Ban on cross-border advertising 
Manufacturing and product standards, e.g. product safety, ingredients, packaging 
Monitoring of compliance 
 
 
Table 2 
Regulation not included in the Tobacco Products Directive 
England Germany 
No ban on flavours No ban on flavours 
Ban on sales to minors Ban on sales to minors 
No ban on non-cross border advertising No ban on non-cross border advertising 
Regulation under medicinal licence for liquids 
containing nicotine higher than 20mg/ml 
Regulation under medicinal licence for liquids 
containing nicotine higher than 20mg/ml 
No restriction on smoking in public places No restriction on smoking in public places 
 
 
 
 
